Let’s talk about the Borgata. Atlantic City is defi nitely not my favorite place. It’s becoming more and more broken down and dirty every time I visit, which is why it almost seems as if the Borgata is not even a part of it. The rooms and restaurants are great with Sea Blue being my favorite of the bunch. But the best thing about the Borgata is their tournament structure. I played the last World Poker Tour event there back in January and had a very disappointing eighth-place fi nish. I played some of the best poker of my life that tournament, and was determined to do it again for the Borgata Poker Open in September.

For the most part on Day 1 I played pretty tight … mostly because I wasn’t getting many cards and hitting many fl ops. I was able to take advantage of some limpers and steal a pot here and there to keep the chip stack slowly climbing.

I played two very interesting hands against a Vietnamese girl (herein referred to as VG). She was in her mid-20s, spoke with a very broken accent, and had satellited in and played tight probably because this was a huge tournament for her. In the few pots she did play, she was generally very aggressive.

At 150/300 blinds with a 25 ante, I open-raised 9-9 in middle position to 900. A loose-aggressive player called on the button. He had been caught in a few big bluffs recently, and the whole table was whispering way too loudly about how crazy he was. It was obvious to me that he was not planning on bluffi ng anytime soon because of this. The SB folded, and VG called in the big blind.

The fl op came K-5-3 with two hearts. VG checked, and I decided to just check. Sometimes I will fi re in this spot, but in this case it would have been way too easy for either player to raise me off my hand. Very few hands in my range can stand a raise. I was planning on calling a single bet from either player (barring a disastrous turn card like the jack of hearts or something). The button also checked.

The turn was a 4, putting a spade draw on the board. VG checked, which meant my hand fi gured to be the best. I bet 2k, the button folded, and VG called.

The river was an off-suit 10. VG checked to me. Once she checks the turn, it seems pretty unlikely that she has a king. The standard play would defi nitely be to bet that turn. The most likely hand seemed to be a pocket pair. Anything from 8-8 through 6-6 seemed likely, although J-J and 10-10 were possibilities. They were less likely as I’d expect to see a bet or a raise from them at some point. Also, she could have had some kind of suited hand like As 5s that hit a pair on the fl op. Even acehigh was possible if she really thought I was bluffi ng.

Even though there were two overcards to my pair, it was just so likely that I had the best hand that I had to try to get value on the river. After thinking for a minute, I decided to bet 5k, and VG went into the tank. She eventually called me, and when I fl ipped my hand over, she gave me a very dejected nod of approval. My hand was good.

About fi fteen minutes later, I played another hand against her. The same loose-aggressive guy limped under the gun, as did the guy right after him, and the VG who was UTG+2. Two players folded, and I raised my black aces to 1500. The fi rst and third limper called, and we were three-way to the fl op. The fl op came Q-8-6 with two diamonds. They both checked to me, and I bet 3200. The fi rst limper folded, and VG raised to 10,000. At this point, she could have a relatively wide range that includes some draws, combo draws, and strong two pair hands or a set. I decided to call.

The turn was an off-suit 5. She quickly grabbed a big pile of chips and pushed 17k forward. This left her with only 14k behind. Generally, when a straightforward player bets more than half of her stack, it means she will not be folding. This is the type of spot where I might get frustrated and just move all in when I’m playing on autopilot, but this time I was able to think things through and fi nd a fold. The only real hands that beat me are 8-8 and 6-6, or maybe two pair if she decided to limp some random suited hand. However, she didn’t seem like the type of player that would be willing to follow through with such a big bluff, especially if she would have to fold after putting more than half her stack in. Even though I never saw her cards, I am confi dent that folding was the right play.

On Day 2, I played a couple of interesting hands against a very different villain. The player in question was in his late 20s, and was opening pots to around fi ve and six times the big blind. He was playing loose and aggressive, but didn’t seem to be thinking on a high level. He was wearing a baseball cap, a buttondown collared shirt, and a cheap but “classy” watch. These are actually things I pay a lot of attention to at the table.

At 500/1000 blinds with a 100 ante, I raised 9-8 suited from three off the button to 2800. Only the Baseball Capped Overbetter (herein: BCO) called from the big blind. The fl op came Q-10-8 with two clubs (I did not have any clubs). He checked and I checked behind which is a very standard play in that spot for me. The turn was a 5 putting a second fl ush draw on the board. He paused for a few seconds, and then bet 8,000 into the 7,000 chip pot. Normally that would scare me, but this was his standard bet size.

This is a pretty close decision for me. Often players of this type will just bet when checked to for a chance to take down the pot. I knew this when I checked the fl op. If I am beat, I am likely to have up to 9 outs. However, the board was relatively scary, and there were a lot of hands he could have that could beat me. I looked at him for a bit, and he seemed genuinely nervous and unhappy about his hand, so I called.

The river was an off-suit 4. BCO bet out 21,500, which was almost the full pot. I looked at him for a couple of minutes, and he exhibited virtually every nervous tell in the book. He seemed so weak that I thought I was probably ahead. I decided to call with my pair of 8s. He paused for a couple of seconds, and fl ipped over T-6 suited with an unhappy look on his face. I checked my cards one last time before mucking, and he seemed surprised as he dragged in the pot.

This was frustrating to say the least. I don’t think this player even thought about whether or not he was bluffi ng or value betting, but basically just bet because that’s what he does. I think I had around 50,000 to 60,000 on the river. I’m still not sure what the correct play would have been on my part, on both the turn and river. I think the turn is really close, and there is a lot to be said for raising the river. I was pretty confi dent about my read, which makes it very hard for him to call an all in no matter what he has.

Even if I made the right play (and I’m not saying I did), I still made the mistake of not thinking things through. After minimal thought, I discounted the possibility of him having a ten, as I knew he wasn’t savvy enough to get value that was that thin. I didn’t give enough credence to the very likely scenario that he just decided to bet without putting any real thought into it or having any real plan.

Not long after that, I played another hand that might seem controversial. BCO limped in the cutoff at 600/1200. To me, this seems extremely transparent as a very weak hand given how spewy and overbetty this player had been. Haralabos Voulgaris raised on the button to 4500. This looked like a super standard isolation play. It’s fairly profi table for Haralabos to raise literally any two cards in that spot. Even if you expect the loose player to call, you can continuation bet (roughly 60% of pot) on any single fl op and take it down a huge percent of the time. Haralabos is a fairly tight player, but I’d still expect him to raise J-10 off-suit almost every time in this spot, and I would not be too surprised to fi nd him raising something like a 10-7 suited.

I should also mention that Haralabos and I had both been card dead. Over the course of three orbits, Haralabos had played two hands. Both times he raised and folded to a reraise. He was visibly frustrated. I went the fi rst 31 minutes of the day not playing a single hand, and my image was still very tight as we were early into level two.

So I was in the small blind with a stack of 22.5k and A-4 off-suit. (Haralabos had just a hair under 40,000, and the BCO covered us both combined). I saw 8500 chips in the pot when it was my turn to act. This was over a third of my stack, so I immediately considered the option of moving all in. Even if I’m around 37% or so to win the hand when called, if Haralabos folds even only the same 37% of the time, then I am already showing a profi t. If he folds as much as 50% of the time, then my average profi t becomes a very signifi cant portion of my stack.

I went for it and moved all in. BCO folded quickly and Haralabos tanked for two full minutes before fi nally calling with K-Q suited. I was lucky to be a favorite against such a strong hand, and even luckier that my hand held up bringing me back to a healthy stack size. This is one of those spots that many players unfamiliar with the math will pass up on without giving a second thought. It is possible that I am making too many assumptions about the hands Haralabos is raising in that spot, but if he is raising a range as wide as I think he is, then this spot is a profi table one to move all in.

Normally, when I write about hands they have some kind of theme or I’m trying to illustrate a point. These hands, however, are just genuinely interesting hands. I’m not even confi dent that I played them all well. Hopefully some of you found these discussions worthwhile, and now might even have a different perspective to look at some situations that you thought were more straightforward than they really are… even if you disagree with my take on them. I guess this is just another one of my articles where I urge you to think a little bit beyond ABC play and really try to assess every unique situation.